Abstract: This article proposes a synthetic new concept of logics of action, intending to apply it to the market, the family, and the polity (inclusive of the state and the community) as crucial instances of what may be termed provisioning domains. These are the broadest or most general domains in which economic activities take place. This article defines a logic of action as a set of socially shared rules of thought and behavior (i.e., socially shared mental models and behavioral rules) that involve a domain of action, the metric used, and the objectives or obligations associated with the positions people occupy in this domain. The domain by itself does not suffice to characterize a logic, and it has to be combined with the other two aspects. The article further discusses the relation between logics of action and institutions, arguing that logics of action are institutions with specific characteristics. They are conceived in relation to very broad provisioning domains and, as such, they have a high degree of generality. The market, the family, and the civic logics may be called provisioning institutional logics, but important differences do exist between the proposed concept herein and some treatments of institutional logics.
1. The definition of a domain of action, including the specification of the domain's boundaries and the individual and collective agents, the positions or roles, and the objects belonging to this domain; 2 2. The units, dimensions, or qualities in terms of which (cardinal or ordinal) measurement should be made -in short, the metric used -in this domain, at least regarding the worth of some especially relevant objects and individuals;
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Such terms as "arena" (Friedland and Alford 1991) , "realm," or even "world" (Boltanski and Thévenot 1991) could substitute this paper's concept of "domain." 3 Max Weber, on the other hand, refers to "spheres," arguing that each sphere has its inner logic (Swedberg 1998, 208, n.6) . I opt for the term "domain" partly because it is also used by Paul DiMaggio (1994; , from whom I borrow the expression "logics of action." However, I have added new aspects to the characterization of logics of action and domains, and I have been influenced by other authors in addition to DiMaggio. 4 The notion of domain here is broader than that of an organizational field, on the basis of which some authors have defined institutional logics (e.g., Owen-Smith and Powell 2008) . Indeed, some domains such as a family may not even involve an organization at all. Each one of us belongs to different domains simultaneously: a family, an organization, a market, a community. Each person also occupies a defined position or performs a specific role -in some cases, more than one position or rolein each of these domains: a parent, an employee, a consumer, a citizen. 5 The boundaries of a domain are not static or predetermined. Rather, they are the object of negotiation, conflict, re-negotiation, and change. In particular, when a logic, typical of a certain situation, is applied to a new one and this becomes socially accepted, the domain of that logic gets expanded.
The establishment of a domain's metric in this paper relates to a logic of action, whereas in Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot's (1991) work, it seems conceptually indissociable from a logic of justification. Generally, logics of action and logics of justification are not equivalent. People may do something for one reason and claim to have done it for a different reason, or they may adopt a logic of action without being concerned with justification (for further comments on this distinction, see Dequech 2008) .
Although logics may often be named after their respective domain, the domain under discussion by itself is not sufficient to define a logic. The logic's two other aspects are crucial for its determination. In any given domain, one can use metrics and have objectives or obligations of different logics. More broadly, activities in any of these domains are often complex, involving a combination of values and motivations. This applies in particular to economic activities (van Staveren 2001, 45-48) . 6 The proposed conceptualization (more specifically, the third item listed above) presupposes the distinction between an instrumental versus non-instrumental action, being intentionally broad in this regard. Each logic, or each position/role within a given logic, may be associated with a specific objective, when behavior is instrumentally oriented. Alternatively, it may also be associated with some appropriate kind of behavior or obligation, when behavior is not instrumentally oriented. However, there is no biunivocal correspondence between non-instrumental action and the self-attribution of obligations. In particular, if some actions can be purely habitual, at least some types of habitual and non-instrumental actions are not -or need not be -linked to obligations. Another possibility is that the adoption of a given logic may combine both instrumental and non-instrumental aspects of actions.
When behavior is instrumental, a logic of action specifies an objective corresponding to a certain position or role in its respective domain. In the present conceptualization, in contrast to some treatments mentioned below, a logic of action does not specify the means to that objetive. This conceptual broadness intentionally leaves room for innovations that amount to new means to a given end. In other words, since agents can devise new means to an end, the means cannot be defined ex ante by a logic of action.
A Non-Exhaustive Typology of Logics of Action, with Special Reference to Provisioning Domains
In order to illustrate some aspects of the concept of logics and show its intended applications, let me now examine a non-exhaustive set of different logics. The logics of action I discuss in this section are arguably some of the most relevant logics for the study of contemporary societies and economies. At least the respective domains of these logics -the market, the family, and the polity (the state and community included) -are vital provisioning domains. Each domain is not, however, exclusively linked to just one specific logic.
The Market Logic
To economists, the most familiar logic is the market logic. When following this logic, an individual may have different positions or roles. In a capitalist economy, for example, an individual may be a consumer, an employee, an entrepreneur, and an investor in a financial market such as the stock exchange, among other possible alternatives.
The boundaries of the market domain are delimited when, through the interaction of its members, a society clearly establishes property rights (Polanyi 1944) and, by means of moral and political conceptions as well as formal or informal restrictions, defines what can or cannot be bought and sold, under what circumstances, and by whom. This varies from one society to another, and from one historical period to the next within the same society. Indeed, the market illustrates very well the idea that the boundaries of a domain may shift. Accordingly, the sale of slaves, human organs, genetically modified goods, drugs, sex, pollution rights, as well as other objects, services, and rights may be forbidden or allowed (Zelizer 1988; Nelson 2005; Beckert 2006 ) at any given place and time. In addition, there are formal and informal prohibitory rules that apply only to some places (e.g., trading inside churches) or to people of a certain age (e.g., the sale of liquor to minors, child labor). Hence, not only is the market an institution that has not existed every time and everywhere, but also each market is supported and delimited by other specific institutions. The market institution does not exist without other institutions.
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Whether specific combinations of these different institutions work or not is a separate question, to which some authors answer by arguing that the market only works well with the help of yet other institutions and with such social features as trust. Furthermore, while the market domain is characterized by a type of exchange, and money is the main unit of account and means of exchange, the market domain is not exactly the domain of money. Money does not only move within the boundaries of this domain or in exchange for goods and services. It may also move in the form of donations, gifts, allowances, reparation payments, taxes, and transfers, among others (Zelizer 1989; Folbre and Nelson 2000) .
The market domain does not by itself define the market logic. First, people may operate and make exchanges in this domain without being guided by the market logic.
9 Consumption is a possible example. One may buy particular goods or services from certain suppliers out of an altruistic concern for the people or community involved, which implies the civic logic, as discussed below. Paid work is another possible example. One may not work solely for the money, but for a combination of reasons, including commitment, and altruistic care for others (Sen 1977; Frey 1997, 88-102; Folbre and Nelson 2000) . Consumption and work are not reduced to exchanges. Even in trading in financial markets this may be valid (see van Staveren 2001, 49 , and the references cited therein).
Second, like any other logic, the market logic is characterized by other features in addition to its domain. One of these features is measurement. Within the market logic, money units are used to (cardinally) measure the worth of objects and people. In the case of objects, worth is measured by their price; with people, worth is measured by their wealth and/or income.
Together with the market domain and monetary measurement, another defining characteristic of the market logic is the goal (or, else, the obligation) of what one may call material or monetary advantage. Emblematic of the market logic in this regard is the position of a financial investor or an entrepreneur in the goods market. One typically attributes the profit motive to these positions or roles. More specifically, in these cases, the market logic embodies the essence of a capitalist economy, as Karl Marx, John Maynard Keynes, and others saw it: the pursuit of pecuniary gain or, simply stated, the use of money to make more money.
10 People in other positions in the market domain who cannot make profits, such as employees and consumers, may also pursue monetary advantage (possibly in combination with other goals, hence, other logics in this same domain). When acting in strict accordance with the market logic, an employee who chooses between two jobs, hypothetically equal in everything except salary, would choose the job with a higher salary. Likewise, a consumer who finds in a shop two items of the exact same product ( brand name, model, expiration date) that have mistakenly been price-tagged differently, will opt for the less expensive one, if acting strictly in accordance with the market logic.
Economists have focused mainly on the market logic using several contrasting approaches. Neoclassical economics, as one of them, not only places special -indeed excessive -emphasis on the market logic (or on the logic of the money economy, as Mitchell [1924] puts it), but also assumes a specific way of applying this logic: It assumes that agents' behavior conforms (at least, should conform) to a set of axioms corresponding to expected utility maximization. This is but one among other conceivable ways of following the market logic. Moreover, in at least some economic contexts, the conceptual apparatus and the utility-maximization axioms are simultaneously too demanding in what is required of people to do and too restrictive in what is allowed of people to do when applying the market logic. Thus, people's computational ability and precision are frequently overestimated, while their creativity is neglected. Even within the market logic, instrumental rationality may assume other forms than utility maximization. Bounded and innovative varieties of rationality may also be instrumental.
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The Civic Logic
The position, role, or capacity associated with the civic logic is that of a member of a community. The boundaries of the civic domain may vary greatly, being those of a neighborhood, a town or city, a state, a region, a country, or the world. Like the other domains discussed herein, this is also a complex one, where different logics of action are possible -that is, not just the civic logic. For example, the market logic is usually the main one guiding both parties in a relation of corruption involving civic matters, while nepotism by definition involves the family logic.
Belonging to the community and contributing to the collective interest are the main qualities on which (ordinal) measurement of people's worth is based within the civic domain. One's duty as a community member is to defend the collective interest of the community. The civic logic may be pursued instrumentally or noninstrumentally. A combination of instrumental and non-instrumental action is also possible in the civic domain. Action, according to the civic logic, may be strictly individual, even when necessarily concerned with the collective interest. It may also be, though it does not have to be, a collective action, organized or not. This is less restrictive than Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot's (1991) characterization of the civic "world," which seems to treat civic action exclusively as a collective action. By the same token, individuals may be worthy in the civic domain even when they do not act in groups or organizations, but their civic worth still depends on whether they act for (the benefit of) a collectivity of people -the community.
The Family Logic
The position, role, or capacity associated with the family logic is, obviously, that of a family member: a mother, a father, a child, a sibling. The perimeter of the family domain varies according to whether one considers the nuclear or the extended family. Complications may arise when a family member has a former spouse, a stepchild, and/or a child born out of wedlock. Moreover, the family domain, like others, is a complex environment in which different logics may guide people's thoughts and actions.
Belonging to the family and contributing to the family's interest are the main general qualities on which (ordinal) measurement of people's worth is based within the family logic. Belonging to the family is, on one hand, a prerequisite for having one's worth measured positively. On the other hand, it can also be a quality that varies in degrees. For example, some people, in some cases, may consider in-laws less worthy than blood relatives. Gender norms and the division of labor within the family often influence and complicate measurement, too.
One's general duty or possible objective as a family member is to protect the collective interest of the family. Exactly how this should be done and by whom, however, could be a matter of disagreement and conflict between family members. Gender norms are particularly important to associating specific objectives or obligations to positions that vary according to gender (not only in the family domain, but also in the market, and the civic ones) (see Badgett and Folbre 1999) .
Like the civic logic, the family logic may also be followed instrumentally, noninstrumentally, or through a combination of instrumental and non-instrumental considerations. Economists (in consumer theory, for example) often refer interchangeably to an individual and his/her family. But it should not be assumed that for an individual there is never a conflict between the market and the family logics, or that there is no variety of views among the family members regarding each of these logics.
Provisioning Logics of Action
Since they are associated with the principal provisioning domains, the market, family, and civic logics can be called provisioning logics of action. In that case, it is important to note two points. First, the logics have an impact on more than the provisioning process itself. In particular, by including a metric in valuation processes, they have an effect on people's well-being (through their social status, self-esteem, etc.) that goes far beyond the material consequences of distribution. Second, not everything that people do within the domains of the family and the polis relates to the provision of goods and services. This set of three logics does not exhaust all the possibilities of logics of action, but it is comprehensive in terms of provisioning logics in that it considers all the main provisioning domains in our societies.
Logics of Action and Institutions
Logics of action are (sets of) socially shared rules of thought and behavior. As such, they are institutions. The logics of action this paper defines are institutions with some important characteristics. First, they are especially conceived in relation to very broad provisioning domains such as the market, the family, and the polity -hence, the expression provisioning logics of action. Second, as such, the logics of action have a very high degree of generality. This means that each logic is compatible with a great variety of ways, first, of specifying the three defining aspects of that logic and, second, of following a particular logic, once these aspects have been specified. For each logic, it is possible to conceive different demarcations of the domain, criteria for the establishment of a metric, and forms of association between objectives/obligations and positions in a domain. In turn, the specific ways of following a given logic also vary in time and space. They may be guided by institutions themselves (of an obviously lesser degree of generality) or they may be, at least for some time, adopted by a single individual or collective agent who deviates from the usual way. This deviant agent is a potentially successful innovator, whose ideas and behavior may then be imitated and diffused, possibly giving rise to a new institution within the broader logic. Innovations could also lead to a new specification of the defining aspects of the logic.
Like other institutional rules of thought and behavior, these provisioning logics can become habitualized and taken for granted, a salient feature of institutions, in the view of many original institutionalists as well as organizational institutionalists. When logics are seen as conflicting, however, the need for conscious deliberation or argumentation emerges. Logics of action may be, in the language of organizational institutionalists, institutionalized to less than a full degree.
The logics conceptualized in this paper can be considered institutional logics of action. Yet, several things should be borne in mind. First, the concept proposed here does not seem to correspond to (and is, hopefully, more explicit, detailed, and precise than) what Roger Friedland and Robert Alford (1991) call institutional logics. Second, unlike some concepts of institutional logics, it is not required here that logics of action be taken for granted. Third, in contrast to some concepts of institutional logics, this article does not define logics of action as prescribing appropriate means to pursue an end, because this would imply that means are given within a logic, while in reality there must be room for innovations that amount to new means to pursue the logic's goal or new ways of fulfilling the logic's obligation. Fourth, the market, family, and civic logics do not correspond to field logics -that is, logics defined in relation to an organizational field which, by referring to a domain with a lower, intermediate degree of aggregation, are less general logics. (All these differences should become clearer as I consider additional related literature, in the next section.)
The first three points imply some improvements in the general notion of institutional logics, regardless of its domain of application. Nevertheless, the concept this paper proposes is applicable to the main provisioning domain. In spite of some general aspects, I do not claim that this concept necessarily works well when other domains are considered (including organizational fields, mentioned in the fourth point). The market, family, and civic logics are, more precisely, provisioning institutional logics.
The concept of these logics of action, which guide people's thoughts and actions in provisioning domains, is also useful in furnishing crucial examples of how institutions influence individuals by performing profound cognitive and motivational roles. These logics of action offer some shared mental models that influence the way people select, organize, and interpret information. They also provide some broad objective(s) and/or obligations for people to pursue or assume in society.
At the same time, the variety of logics opens more room for individual persons in at least three ways. First, as already mentioned, the perception that logics are conflicting creates the need for deliberation, including the exercise of critical thinking. Second, as new circumstances arise, individuals may try to adapt by testing various logics, which, in turn, may contribute to generating a variety in the process. 12 Third, individuals, often united as collective agents, may introduce novelty by combining different logics, hence having a more proactive role (in addition to reacting to change that comes from elsewhere). There are, for example, organizations or social movements that have been combining the civic and the market logics in new ways. This is the case, for instance, with for-profit organizations that use all their profits to help the poor.
Additional Related Literature

Frames and Logics of Action
In a survey on culture and economy, Paul DiMaggio (1994, 39) uses the expression "logics of action" to designate "a finite set of context-dependent orientations," or "systems of scripts, norms, and schemas among which people shift." He identifies different versions of this argument in economics and sociology. A simple, dualist version distinguishes between an individualistic frame for action and one concerned with other people, social values, and suchlike. More complex versions of the argument see people as switching between multiple logics. DiMaggio (1994, 39) does not develop the concept, but he manages to clarify it with such examples as the logic of the marketplace, the logic of the polity, and the logic of the family. He also associates different logics with different values. The approach in terms of logics allows one to see existing norms, for example, not only as "prohibitions against invoking "market logic," but also [as reflecting] the positive valence of another value set (e.g., familial, civic)" (1994, 40).
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Institutional Logics
In a more recent article, DiMaggio (1997, 277) states that the "most thorough exposition and definition" of logics of action is provided by Roger Friedland and Robert Alford (1991) . Now the notion of logics is directly related to institutions, and the various logics are labeled as institutional. In the words of Friedland and Alford (1991, 248) , "[e]ach of the most important institutional orders of contemporary Western societies has a central logic -a set of material practices and symbolic constructions -which constitutes its organizing principles and which is available to organizations and individuals to elaborate." According to these authors, the core institutions of these societies are capitalist market, nuclear family, bureaucratic state, democracy, and Christian religion (1991, 232 and 249).
The institutional logic of capitalism is accumulation and the commodification of human activity. That of the state is rationalization and the regulation of human activity by legal and bureaucratic hierarchies. That of democracy is participation and the extension of popular control over human activity. That of the family is community and the motivation of human activity by unconditional loyalty to its members and their reproductive needs. That of religion, or science for that matter, is truth, whether mundane or transcendental, and the symbolic construction of reality within which all human activity takes place. These institutional logics are symbolically grounded, organizationally structured, politically defended, and technically and materially constrained, and hence have specific historical limits. (Friedland and Alford 1991, 248-249) Although Friedland and Alford's contribution as a whole is very valuable, this description of the various "institutional logics" is not completely clear. Nor is it exactly what one would have imagined after reading DiMaggio.
14 While in the above quotation Friedland and Alford seem to attribute a logic to institutions, DiMaggio (1994, 39) portrays these authors as suggesting that "for each of the several domains (family, polity, economy) a fundamental principle implies a range of goals, strategies, and bases of evaluation."
15 Apart from being useful to my argument, this statement of DiMaggio seems also easily compatible with Friedland and Alford's idea that the multiple logics are "available to individuals and organizations" (1991, 232) . While I define logics of action in relation to specific institutions, and even as institutions of a special type themselves, I also see them as attributes of, or followed by, agents. Relatedly, DiMaggio's examples are more easily associable with goals, obligations, or motives. What are the individual's goals or obligations in the logic of the bureaucratic state? What about in the logic of religion? Friedland and Alford's answers to these questions, if any, are not clear. Admittedly, Friedland and Alford (1991, 252) do refer to "the distinctive categories, beliefs, and motives created by a specific institutional logic." It seems better to say that motives or goals partly define and are also defined by a specific logic.
Some interpreters like Patricia Thornton and William Ocasio (2008, 101 ) see Friedland and Alford (1991) as arguing that institutional logics provide social actors with vocabularies of motive and a sense of self (i.e., identity). Perhaps this is more an interesting development of Friedland and Alford's original arguments than a literal interpretation, since the latter authors strictly attribute this type of influence to institutions rather than to institutional logics (1991, 240 and 251) . The interpretation is, however, consistent with Thornton and Ocasio's own definition of institutional logics, which resembles the concept of institutions adopted by many other authors. These logics are defined as "the socially constructed historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and space, and provide meaning to their social reality" (Thornton and Ocasio 1999, 804; 2008, 101) . In any case, their conception is much richer and more specific than implied by the preceding definition which, in contrast with the approach I propose, does not specify important aspects (i.e., domains, positions, metrics, and objectives/obligations) that indicate the variety of logics and reveal how logics of action are a specific type of institution.
Explicitly going beyond Friedland and Alford's (1991) seminal paper, Thornton and Ocasio (2008, 102) elaborate on the notion of institutional logic so as to highlight coercive and normative aspects. The authors see the emphasis on these aspects as distinguishing "the institutional logics approach" from its precursors, which they characterize as examples of a "logics of action approach," but this terminological distinction is not made by others (e.g., DiMaggio 1994 . Regardless of these conceptual issues, Thornton and Ocasio make an important contribution to the theory of institutional logics and how institutional logics influence individuals. 17 Another controversial conceptual issue is the relation between institutional logics and organizational fields. Some authors have interpreted Friedland and Alford's institutional logics as defined with reference to an organizational field. Without necessarily attributing the same view to Friedland and Alford, Jason Owen-Smith and Walter Powell (2008, 602) state that "[l]ogics constitute the rules and conventions of a particular organizational field. In broad terms, an institutional logic is the constellation of beliefs and associated practices (the schemas and scripts) that a field's participants hold in common." For Thornton and Ocasio (2008, 119) , in contrast, institutional logics are commonly misconstrued as stemming from an organizational field. In Friedland and Alford's formulation, institutional logics do seem to be different from (or not restricted to) what Richard Scott (2008, 200) calls "field logics."
In any case, the three provisioning institutional logics are not field logics. Their domains are broader than organizational fields. This and other points of contrast between the concept of logics of action I propose and some treatments of institutional logics were explained above.
Logic of Consequences and Logic of Appropriateness
Some scholars in the literature on logics of action criticize neoclassical economics and its sociological counterparts for an excessive emphasis on individual instrumental rationality (e.g., Friedland and Alford 1991, 232 and 234) . Referring specifically to economic sociology, Mark Granovetter (2002, 53) has pointed out the stress on the mixture of instrumental and non-instrumental action and on multiple motives among the main foundations for future contributions. James March and Johan Olsen (1989; also March 1994) offer another distinction of "logics," naming the "logic of consequences" and the "logic of appropriateness." March (1994, 2) sees the logic of consequences as that which is pursued by a rational procedure. Rationality for him is what others (this paper's author included) call instrumental rationality. An instrumental action is oriented toward a goal or a set of goals. In the most general terms, an instrumentally rational action can be defined as one that is, in light of the agents' beliefs, adequate to the achievement of that goal or set of goals. In March's view, (instrumental) rationality can either be the pure form of rationality assumed by neoclassical economics, which the late Herbert Simon (March's co-author of other works) called "substantive rationality," or the limited form assumed by March, Simon, and others, sometimes under the alternative labels of "bounded" or "procedural rationality." Yet another possibility of instrumental rationality should be added, involving the rationality of innovation (Dequech 2001) .
Following the logic of consequences requires considering alternative actions, imagining their potential consequences and respective likelihood, determining the decision-maker's preferences over these consequences, and adopting a procedure for choosing among the alternatives (March 1994, 2-3) .
By contrast, following the logic of appropriateness requires (explicitly or implicitly) answering the following three questions: In sum, an agent following the logic of appropriateness adopts the kind of behavior that is appropriate to the agent's identity or role in a particular situation. 18 This is a rule-following behavior, according to March (1994, 58) , in the sense that the agent follows "rules of appropriate or exemplary behavior" (March and Olsen 2006, 689) . 19 March and Olsen trace the origins of their concept of logic of appropriateness back to an ancient "vision of actors following internalized prescriptions of what is socially defined as normal, true, right or good, without, or in spite of, calculation of consequences and expected utility" (2006, 690) .
There is also proximity between the logic of appropriateness and the noninstrumental type of commitment discussed by Amartya Sen (1977 Sen ( , 1985 . Commitment occurs when something like "the knowledge of torture of others does not make you feel personally worse off, but you think it is wrong and you are ready to do something to stop it" (Sen 1977, 326 ). Sen's broad definition of commitment allows room for cases in which "a person's choice happens to coincide with the maximization of his personal welfare, but that is not the reason for his choice." This broad sense, he continues, "may have particular relevance when one acts on the basis of a concern for duty which, if violated, could cause remorse, but the action is really chosen out of the sense of duty rather than just to avoid the illfare resulting from the remorse that would occur if one were to act otherwise" (Sen 1977, 327; also 2002, 34-35) . Particularly when resulting from a sense of duty, commitment is noninstrumental, and thus is strongly linked to March and Olsen's logic of appropriateness. The link is even clearer when one considers that for Sen the issue of commitment "relates closely to that of the 'identity' of a person, that is, how the person sees himself or herself" (Sen 1985, 348) . 20 Someone might say that a person who acts out of a sense of duty has the objective of fulfilling his/her obligations. March and Olsen write that " [a] ctors seek to fulfill the obligations encapsulated in a role, an identity, a membership in a political community or group, and the ethos, practices and expectations of its institutions" (2006, 689, emphasis added) . While this may suggest a goal-seeking behavior, March and Olsen do not argue that this type of action is taken because its consequences are expected to be favorable to the attainment of a goal. March and Olsen do not seem ready, therefore, to abandon their distinction between logics.
March (1994, 58) refers to different roles played by decision makers: "a mother, a manager, a college student." This reference to roles links the discussion of appropriateness with that of logics of actions, in the sense that in both cases one considers the same person in different types of position. March's logics are not, however, the same as logics of actions.
As defined here, logics of action associate positions to objectives or to obligations. When adopting each logic of action, one can act instrumentally, therefore, following March's logic of consequences. 21 In particular, instrumental action does not take place only in the market domain. Alternatively, in the case of some (if not all) logics of action, one could act non-instrumentally. In particular, when one acts out of a sense of obligation (as opposed to the pursuit of an end), one acts in accordance with March and Olsen's logic of appropriateness. This is possible with different logics of action. In addition, each logic of action has its respective domain, while each of March's logics can be followed in many different domains.
Concluding Remarks
Logics of action and related notions are very useful instruments for the study of individual and collective behavior. Economists in general have not only focused too much on the market logic, but also have adopted a limited view of the market domain and the provisioning process. However, they are slowly opening their discipline to other types of consideration, which are also relevant for understanding economic issues. Economists must pay close attention to contributions from other disciplines that refer more explicitly to logics. Work on this topic is essentially multidisciplinary, not least because of the multiple domains of action to which the notion of logic may apply and which may be involved in a given social situation. This kind of work deals with complex issues, and despite the considerable progress that has been made, the search for more systematization and precision continues. This paper sought to take a few additional steps toward proposing a synthetic concept of logics of action and applying it to the most important provisioning domains. The concept proposed here identified three main aspects that, when combined, characterize a logic of action. These are: a domain of action (including its boundaries, inhabitants, and positions or roles, among other features), a metric of worth in this domain, and one or more objectives or obligations associated with the positions or roles that people occupy in this domain. This conceptual proposal seems particularly useful or suitable to understanding logics of action in three crucial provisioning domains: the market, the polity, and the family. Whether it is also suitable to discuss other logics of action (including institutional logics and field logics discussed in sociology and organizational studies) is a matter for future debate. Even if this turns out not to be the case, the ideas this article presented may prompt other authors to develop their own concepts. In contrast, some concepts of logics of action (e.g., Bacharach, Bamberger and Sonnenstuhl 1996) and related notions focus on means and ends, thus being restricted to instrumental behavior. 8.
In this fundamental sense, Hodgson (1999) is right in that a "pure" market does not exist, although I prefer not to suggest that actual markets are "impure," as this may have a negative connotation. On the other hand, at the same time that other social institutions are inevitably mixed with the market, the market is part of society at large, as it does not exhaust all social activities. All this means that the separation between market and society is not clear-cut (see also Dolfsma, Finch and McMaster 2005) . 9. This is a way of expressing Nancy Folbre and Julie Nelson's idea that real markets are more complex than markets idealized by economists (2000, (133) (134) . It is also a way of expressing their rejection of the notion that "when one acts on the market, one is expected to be heartless and strive for pure personal advantage" (Folbre and Nelson 2000, 138) . 10. By including the monetary metric and the goal of monetary advantage in the market logic, the concept of logics of action converges with Anne Mayhew's (2006) stress on two conditions for application of what she calls "the commercial logic." The first condition is the existence of "a numeraire" and the second is that "the goals of the units being analyzed must be the goal of having commonly measured inflows at least equal to or in excess of outflows" (Mayhew 2006, 320) . 11. What I call the market logic is different from what André Orléan defines as "the pure market logic," namely "the abstract social structure" built on the basis of two hypotheses: "(H1) the economic agent is a rational individual pursuing his personal interest, which technically takes the form of a maximization, under constraints, of his utility; (H2) the social interaction that renders the individual decisions mutually compatible is the market" (1994, 10, my translation) . This is a description of how a traditional branch of neoclassical economics (the Arrow-Debreu model) treats not only a very special and abstract version of the market logic, as I call it, but also the coordination issue. In addition to being compatible with non-neoclassical notions of rationality, my conception of the market logic does not require any hypothesis concerning the coordinating powers of the market. 12. I owe this point to Rick Adkisson. 13. This reference to civic values helps us understand what DiMaggio means by the logic of polity. 14. On the other hand, a later passage in Friedland and Alford (1991) is closer to DiMaggio's idea of logics of action, when they refer to important struggles over "which institutional logic different activities are to be regulated and to which categories of persons they apply. Is access to housing and health to be regulated by the market or by the state? Are families, churches, or states to control education?" (1991, 25).
